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Abstract
This case-study analyzes the efforts of South Boston Community Housing Inc., the Economic
Development Department at Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation in
starting Boston Electric Vehicle Company (BEVC) in South Boston. This case study is based on
fifteen open-ended interviews with key actors conducted between January and March 1997, archival
research, and participant observation between December 1995 and August 1996.
In merging research on business development and networks, this case-study analyzes the failure of
South Boston Community Housing, Inc., Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing
Corporation to start Boston Electric Vehicle Company. There are three components to this
analysis: (1) a characterization of the network consisting of South Boston Community Housing,
Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation; (2) an application of Timmons
(1986) model of business development to understand the extent to which these three organizations
brought the necessary resources to bear to start BEVC and (3) an understanding of the reasons
South Boston Community Housing and Boston Edison devoted time and resources to starting
BEVC. One of the main recommendations is the need for community organizations to gain the
knowledge and experience to evaluate business development opportunities for themselves. In
addition, this analysis suggests the need for community organizations to continually evaluate the
networks they utilize to start businesses. I provide a useful framework for practitioners in deciding
to start a business in their community.
Thesis Supervisor: Karl Seidman
Title: Lecturer
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Introduction
This case study focuses on the failure of South Boston Community Housing, the
Economic Development Department at Boston Edison (Boston Edison) and Specialty Vehicle
Manufacturing Corporation (SVMC) to start an electric bus manufacturing company, Boston
Electric Vehicle Company (BEVC), in South Boston. While South Boston Community Housing
(SBCH) and Boston Edison began working together in January of 1995, this case-study is limited to
analyzing the efforts of these three organizations to start BEVC from December 1995 to August
1996. This choice has to do with the fact that SBCH and Boston Edison were not working with
SVMC until December 1995. More importantly, without SVMC, SBCH and Boston Edison did not
have the technology nor the experience in electric vehicle manufacturing to start an electric bus
company in South Boston.
Because SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC relied on one another to start BEVC, rather
than an entrepreneur, I apply a network approach to business development to analyze the ways in
which these three organizations facilitated or constrained the business development process. Given
that SBCH, a community development corporation in South Boston, played such a large part in this
effort, I use this case-study to elaborate on the potential roles a community organization can adopt
in starting businesses with the private sector. As a result, this case-study is relevant for both private
and public sector organizations interested in working together to start businesses.
In applying the literature on both networks and business development to analyze the start-
up of BEVC, I developed the following questions to guide my analysis:
1. Why did South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle
Manufacturing Corporation work together to form an electric vehicle manufacturing plant?
2. Did South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing
Corporation bring the necessary resources to bear to start BEVC?
3. Did South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing
Corporation adequately manage the business start-up process?
4. In what ways did the network consisting of South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison
and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation influence the business development process?
Recognizing the diverse audiences which may read this case-study, I would like to provide a
brief road map for the reader. For the remainder of this chapter, I expand on the importance of
start-ups to a local economy, the role community organizations can adopt in starting businesses and
the importance of networks in starting businesses. Chapter 2 describes the methodology and
analytical frameworks applied in this case-study. For those not interested in research methods, I
suggest skipping this chapter and beginning with chapter 3. Chapter 3 is crucial to understanding
this case study because it provides an overview of the effort to start Boston Electric Vehicle
Company. The analysis spans chapters 4 through 6. Chapter 4 characterizes the network consisting
of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC. Chapter 5 applies Timmons (1986) model of business
development to understand the extent to which BEVC brought the necessary resources to bear to
start BEVC. Lastly, chapter 6 delves into the reasons SBCH and Boston Edison chose to start
BEVC and work with SVMC after knowing that BEVC was not feasible. In conclusion, chapter 7
offers lessons for practitioners interested in business development.
The Role of Start-ups and Small Businesses in the U.S. Economy
Community organizations and economic development practitioners should consider
supporting the start-up of businesses as a means to create jobs and stimulate economic activity in
their communities. Birch (1987) has shown that new businesses not only created the majority of
jobs in the U.S. economy from 1981 - 1985, but,
... the healthiest economies have more rather than less internal turbulence.
They experience greater levels of start-ups, of growth - and often decline
and failure as well - than do the more stagnant ones. (pg. 21)
Birch (1987) draws his conclusions from an analysis of data provided by Dun and Bradstreet. What
distinguishes this data from County Business Pattern Data and the Census of Manufacturers is that
Dun and Bradstreet keep records of the employment rolls, age, and location of each business.
Having compiled a comprehensive database of new and dying firms from 1969 to 1985, Birch
obtains a picture of the economy that few are privy. As opposed to aggregate measures such as
Gross National Product and Unemployment, Birch observes the employment gained and lost to
the birth and death of new firms.
The results Birch provides are astounding. From 1981 to 1985, "companies with 1-19
employees accounted for 82 percent of the job expansion and concerns (businesses) with over
5,000 lost 13.5 percent net." Since startups are more likely to hire anywhere from 1-19 people,
rather than 5,000, Birch attributes this employment growth to start-ups. Looking at this data by
location, Birch finds that, "variations in aggregate job growth from place to place are much more a
function of variations in replacement rates than in loss rates." For example, Charlotte, with the
highest loss rate at 4 0.4 %, created the second highest number of jobs at 7.5% because it possessed
the second highest replacement rate at 48%. Thus, not only are small firms creating the majonity of
the jobs, but areas in which there is a high degree of start-ups, witness the highest degree of job
growth, regardless of the loss in employment for that period.
Piore (1990) corroborates Birch's results with an analysis of County Business Pattern.
Although his results are not as extreme, they are in the same direction. Similarly, Piore
demonstrates that the majority of jobs created since the seventies can be attributed to small
businesses. Small businesses, as Piore defines, hire less than 100 people, employed approximately
55.9 million individuals or 55.9% of all employment is accounted for by establishments which hire
less than 100 people.
Differences in employment growth can be attributed to the data sources as well as to the
different techniques employed by the two authors. Dun and Bradstreet data is specified by firm,
while County Business Pattern data does not identify businesses, therefore it is not possible to
follow one firm through time as does Birch. Still, it does not reconcile that Birch found such a large
employment effect attributed to firms employing less than twenty people, whereas Piore cannot
attribute the same amount to firms which employ less than 100 people. Another possible
explanation is that County Business Pattern data looks at employment at a particular point in time,
while Birch is able to look at employment created through time. This is important because it may be
the case that when the census was being administered a number of firms had recently closed or
were not accounted because of sampling error.
Community Organizations and Business Development
While Birch demonstrates that fostering the growth of new businesses is one way to create
jobs and stimulate economic activity, he does not discuss the role of community organizations in
starting these businesses. The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the ways in which a
community organization can participate in the start-up of a business. Instead of an exhaustive
review of the literature, I use Michael Porter's (1995) model of economic development as a spring
board for this discussion.
My focus on Porter's model of economic development is intentional. In this case, Boston
Edison, the "private sector", initiated efforts to start Boston Electric Vehicle Company. In
addition, Boston Edison asked SBCIH, a not for profit organization, to participate in this project as
a means to garner community support. Because of the similarities between Porter's model of
economic development and the role of Boston Edison and SBCH, I feel that this case offers a
unique opportunity to demonstrate that Porter's model of economic development is simplistic -
private sector involvement does not guarantee the success of business development efforts in the
"inner-city". Thus, instead of seeking partnerships with the private sector, community organizations
should focus their efforts on promoting viable businesses.
Porter's model of economic development, while subject to criticism on a number of
different levels, forces community development practitioners and government to consider what role
they are going to play in creating jobs for low-income and displaced workers. Porter subjugates the
government and community-based organizations to the private sector. Government can facilitate
the growth of businesses in the inner-city by investing in infrastructure improvements and ensuring
that vacant sites are environmentally sound. Porter entrusts community based organizations to
assuage community resentment in the development process. Thus, in Porter's model, the
government and community-based organizations serve the private sector.
While it may be the case that experience demonstrates the need for the government and
community organizations to fill these roles, Porter ignores the dangers associated with community
organizations passively working with the private sector. First, if the private sector fails to deliver on
a promise to develop a business in a particular area, then a community organization might
jeopardize its reputation and waste valuable resources in organizing their community. Second, the
government may have diverted resources to improve the land and infrastructure when there may
have been other more successful projects to devote the money. Instead of blindly trusting the
private sector, community organizations and the government need to understand the business
development process and internalize the capacity to evaluate business proposals so that they can
minimize the probability that they will squander time and money promoting businesses that the
private sector is confident will succeed.
Business Development and the Role of Networks
Crucial to Porter's model of economic development is the collaboration of organizations to
start a business. While Porter advocates for a specific network consisting of community
organizations, government and the private sector to start businesses in the inner-city or other
distressed areas, within the business development literature, there is a growing recognition and
understanding that networks composed of organizations or individuals are important to starting
businesses. This section reviews some of the literature surrounding the role of networks in business
development. For community development corporations (CDC's) and other community
development practitioners interested in business development, this section is important because it is
more than likely that a community-based organization will rely or participate in a network to start a
business. This follows from a recent piece by Keyes et al. (1996) in which they demonstrate that
CDC's depend on networks to develop affordable housing.
Recent work by organizational theorists abandon personality based theories and rational
actor models of entrepreneurship in favor of models that emphasize the relationships that
individuals/ organizations rely on to start a business and the ways in which these relationships
influence the business start-up process (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986, Van De Ven, 1993, Powell
1990, Malecki, 1994, Granovetter, 1985 and Granovetter, 1995).
Personality-based theories and economic models have been unable to adequately predict the
success of business start-ups. Personality-based theories seek to uncover the traits that are common
to successful entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, personality-based theories have been unable to locate
the one trait or locus of traits responsible for successful business creation. As a result, personality-
based theories consistently under predict the rate of entrepreneurship and new firm formation
(Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). Aldrich and Zimmer's criticism of personality-based theories is best
explained by Granovetter (1985). Granovetter (1985) argues that personality-based theories
oversocialize the economic agent such that:
Once we know in just what way an individual has been affected, ongoing
social relations and structures are irrelevant. Social influences are all
contained inside an individual's head, so, in actual decision situations,
he or she can be atomized as any Homo economicus, though perhaps with
different rules for decisions.
In other words, personality-based theories suffer from a tendency to assume that only people with
specific traits will start businesses. The problem with these models is that individuals who deviate
from this stereotype are ignored. Also, those who do fit the model may not necessarily start
businesses.
Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) argue that rational actor models have not had much success
understanding the business start-up process. They argue that humans are not rational actors: people
have difficulty judging information objectively, making causal statements and limit themselves to
easily accessible information. Granovetter (1985) adds that rational actor models tend to
"undersocialize" individuals in that they assume individuals operate alone maximizing utility
independently.
In lieu of personality-based and rational actor models, Granovetter (1985) opts for an
embedded analysis of economic action. Granovetter (1985) defines embedded analysis in the
following passage:
At the other extreme lies what I call the argument of "embededdness": the
argument that the behavior to be analyzed are so constrained by ongoing
social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous mis-
understanding. (pgs. 481 - 482)
Using an embedded analysis should enrich our understanding of the business start-up process
because:
Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do
do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular
intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts
at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems
of social relations. (Granovetter, 1985, pg. 487)
Essentially the first to apply Granovetter' s (1985) theory to the business start-up process,
Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) argue that in order to start a business, entrepreneurs need "linkages" or
networks. Following Aldrich and Zimmer are a number of models of the business start-up process
that incorporate the role of networks (Van De Ven, 1993 and VanderWerf, 1993).
Van De Ven (1993) argues that new businesses require an infrastructure to develop. This
infrastructure is composed of three elements: proprietary functions, resource endowments and
institutional arrangements. Proprietary functions include the market that is available for a product,
the technological development and the network/resource channels available to an entrepreneur.
Resource endowments include the basic research a product is based on, the money available for
product development and the labor supply. Institutional arrangements include the prevailing
technology standards, government regulations and trust between organizations. In his theory, Van
De Ven captures the importance of environment and networks, only with different labels.
VanderWerf (1993) posits an innovative model for analyzing new firm formation as the new
firm interacts with the environment through time. He conceptualizes the business start-up process
as a funnel. The funnel is wide-open in the beginning and slowly narrows through time as
individuals or groups of individual interact with their environment. Factors which influence the
shape of the funnel are: technological development, business opportunity, publicity, competition,
and profit. Each one of these factors can exert a positive or negative impact on the business start-
up process, such that a positive influence widens the funnel and a negative influence constricts the
funnel. For instance, the more companies that enter a market, the lower the profits, discouraging
people from entering in the future. At the end of the funnel, VanderWerf credits the will and
motivation of the entrepreneur for success. Thus, VanderWerf implicitly subjugates the network
involved in the business start-up process to the individual entrepreneur.
VanderWerfs (1993) model, designed to apply to businesses in emerging industries, does
not necessarily apply to new manufacturing companies. An alternative theory posed by Dean et al.
(1993) does not incorporate the importance of networks, rather purely focuses on market
organization to predict the likelihood of new firm formation. They argue that perceived business
opportunities in manufacturing are dependent on the organization of firms within a particular
industry. They predict that new manufacturing firms thrive in those industry's where existing firms
are hierarchical, beauracratic and slow to respond to technical change. On the other hand,
industries in which firms respond quickly to demand discourage new firm formation.
Models of the business start-up process which have followed from Aldrich and Zimmer
(1986), while giving credit to networks and the importance of social relations, do not explicitly
isolate networks and discuss their influence in the business start-up process. Instead, Van De Ven
(1993) and VanderWerf (1993) present theories in which networks are just another way to analyze a
business start-up, while Dean et al. (1993) completely ignore the role of networks. Perhaps, this may
be because networks do not in and of themselves explain the success or failure of a business start-
up. On the other hand, it may be due to the fact that it is difficult to isolate networks and study
them. Granovetter (1995) argues that networks are difficult to study because they are not legal
entities and thus do not generate an abundance of data to analyze. This does not mean that
networks have not or cannot be studied, jusi that the task can be difficult.
Understanding Networks
In order to facilitate the study of networks, I turn to the literature on networks. This is
important because it has been shown that networks vary in their form and organization. Also, the
characteristics of effective networks have been identified. In this section, I elaborate on the
characteristics of successful networks and discuss the ways in which they might vary as background
for chapter 4 in which I characterize the network consisting of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC.
By characterizing the network consisting of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC, I am able to discuss
the ways in which their relationships influenced their efforts to start BEVC.
Powell (1990) argues that networks, similar to markets and hierarchies, offer a means of
exchange. In contrast to the impersonal transactions that occur in the market and the beauracracy
involved in firms Powell (1990)distinguishes well functioning networks by reciprocity, collaboration,
trust and mutual obligation:
Networks are "lighter on their feet" than hierarchies. In network modes of resource
allocation, transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges nor by
administrative fiat, but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal,
preferential mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they involve
neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of the
hierarchy. The basic assumption of network relationships is that one party
is dependent on resources controlled by another, and that there are gains to be had
by the pooling of resources. In essence, the parties to a network agree to
forgo the right to pursue their own interests at the expense of others. (pg. 303)
There are benefits which accrue to those engaged in a network. For instance, networks offer the
opportunity to share risk and to spread information more quickly. Also, networks offer the
opportunity to pool needed resources. For all the benefits associated with networks, there is still the
risk that things will go sour. Challenges confronting networks emanate from the inability of goals to
converge, individual organizations may conceal agendas and there is the possibility that a
participating organization or individual will walk away with valuable information.
In order to understand why some networks are successful, while others fail in attaining their
mission, it may be necessary to understand the conditions under which they formed. In his analysis
of business groups, which are similar to networks, Granovetter (1995) argues that, "The why
question has in fact been addressed several times in the literature." Four reasons Granovetter cites
for firms or individuals to engage in networks: (1) resource dependence, (2) the need for strategic
alliances, (3) the need for individuals or organizations to unite for a "cause" and (4) the idea that
through coalitions firms or individuals can extract "rents" from the economy. Because the "why"
question has been sufficiently answered, Granovetter (1995) argues that it is more important that
researchers pay attention to the "how" question - "how economic actors construct these
alliances?". In order to answer this question, Granovetter (1995) reviews the literature to show that
networks can vary in five ways: (1) why they come together, (2) differences in ownership structure,
(3) variations in authority, (4), the importance of morals and (5) the influence of the state.
Granovetter (1995) argues that there are many reasons business groups may form. He uses
the term "axis of solidarity" to classify these reasons. Among the reasons Granovetter lists include,
ethnicity, region, religion and an interlocking directorate. For Granovetter, the importance in
understanding what binds a group facilitates the researcher in predicting what will destroy a group.
For instance, if living or working in the same region is the reason for a group to form, then there is
always the issue that when the region changes that the group will no longer stay together.
Granovetter argues that the more successful groups have more than one "axis of solidarity" to unite
around. Similarly, Powell (1990) provides a similar list of categories that serve as motivations for
individuals or groups to form networks, but adds, "the more homogenous the group, the greater
the trust, hence the easier it is to sustain network-like arrangements."
With respect to ownership, there are four options that Granovetter makes explicit:
multidivisional form, holding company, managing agency system and no ownership links. In the
multidivisional form, there is a central beauracracy that controls resource allocation and decision
making for all units. In a holding company, the central unit, merely holds stock in all of its subunits,
but allows each subunit to raise capital and make decisions for itself. In the managing agency
system, a group of firms will sign an agreement with one company to perform all management
duties. Lastly, companies in a business group may not be owned by one another and remain
completely autonomous.
Similar to the discussion of ownership above, there are two extremes in which authority
structure differs. Authority structures may be hierarchical such that one firm controls the actions of
all those in the business group or network. At the other extreme, power may be diffused among the
members in the group such that each firm remains autonomous and has the right to make its own
decisions. In an empirical piece looking at networks in Japan, Goto (1982) finds that both extremes
exist in Japan. Goto found that firms involved in a network in which every member has equivalent
power use the network to share invaluable business and technology information and benefit from
the transaction of intermediate goods. For business groups in which one firm controls the actions
of all other firms, he found that small to medium sized firms fell into this category because of their
need for access to funds and other resources. Thus, the authority structure may relate valuable
information about the needs of the groups involved.
Research on networks and business groups points to the fact that there are many ways in
which they may vary. In characterizing the network or business group composed of SBCH, Boston
Edison and SVMC in chapter 4, not only do I explain how and why this network formed, but I
analyze the extent to which trust and reciprocity existed between these three organizations
Conclusion
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, my aspiration is that both community and
economic development practitioners will read this case - study. There are three reasons for this.
First, to provide them with an opportunity to see how a particular network influences the business
development process. Second, to learn from a failed attempt to start a business. Third, to debate
the ways in which community organizations can participate in the start-up of businesses. By looking
at the ways in which South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle
Manufacturing Corporation worked together to start BEVC, I accomplish these goals.
Chapter 2: Methodology
Introduction
This chapter discusses the data collection methods and theoretical frameworks employed to
analyze the influence of the network consisting of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC in starting
Boston Electric Vehicle Company in South Boston. To this end, this thesis analyzes this case in
three ways. First, I characterize the network consisting of South Boston Community Housing,
Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation. Second, I apply Timmons (1986)
framework of business development to ascertain the extent to which an entrepreneur, the business
opportunity and the necessary resources existed to start BEVC. Lastly, I elaborate on the reasons
SBCH and Boston Edison chose to work with SVMC.
Collecting Data
Sources of Information
Information for this thesis derives from three sources: (1) an extensive compilation of
memorandum, letters, meeting notes and personal notes saved by Gallo at South Boston
Community Housing, (2) 15 open-ended, face-to-face interviews of varying length with just about
everyone involved in this project and (3) impressions I formed while working on this project at
SBCH. Interviews were conducted between January and March 1997, while information compiled
by Gallo spans from January 1995 to August 1996. It is important to note that the notes, memos
and letters are more than a compilation of material sent from SBCH to other organizations, because
of the extensive communication between Boston Edison and SBCH, it includes information sent
exclusively to Boston Edison. With these three sources of information, I was able to triangulate
assertions made in the interviews.
Sample
The sample for this analysis initially consisted of 14 individuals, divided into two groups.
Because two people could not be reached and three people were added to the sample, a total of
fifteen people were interviewed for this thesis. The three people that were added were referred by
the original 12 interviewees.
Individuals within this sample were separated into two groups The first group consisted of
"network" members and the second group consisted of "non-network" members. Individuals and
organizations in the network members group assumed responsibility on a daily basis for starting
Boston Electric Vehicle Company. More precisely, network members contributed to strategizing,
business planning and fundraising. Organizations included in this group are South Boston
Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation. Of the 15
people interviewed, 6 people were placed into the network members category. The other 9 people,
representing such organizations as the Boston Empowerment Center, Bank of Boston and
Northeast Alternative Vehicle Consortium were placed into the non-network member category.
Individuals in this group were not responsible for starting BEVC, but were asked to review the
business to provide some form of assistance. There is one exception to this rule. Although Mr.
John Powell of the Electric Transportation Vehicle Institute neither reviewed the business plan nor
was approached to support the project, he was interviewed because of his extensive knowledge of
the electric bus industry and its technology. Please refer to Appendix I for a detailed list of those
interviewed.
Inteniew
Two interview schedules were developed for this thesis - one interview for network
members and one for non-network members. Because the questions were open-ended and face to
face the time to complete an interview depended on the responses of the interviewee. Some
interviews were completed in fifteen minutes, while others took almost two hours. I administered
all of the interviews and took notes during the interview as a means to record responses.
For both network and non-network members, the interview consisted of five sections.
Network members were asked to characterize their working relationships with other network
members, evaluate the project, provide background information on their company or organization
and describe the reaction of non-network members to this project. Non-network members were
asked to evaluate the project, the network members, the business opportunity and market for
electric buses and provide background information on their involvement. Importantly, network
members were all exposed to the same interview, while non-network members were exposed to the
same interview. Please refer to Appendix 2 for the questionnaires administered to non-network
members and network members. The questionnaire attached for network members was
administered to South Boston Community Housing, Inc..
Analysis
The analysis is designed to accomplish the following goals: (1) characterize the network
consisting of South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle
Manufacturing Corporation, (2) apply a framework for business development to ascertain the extent
to which the necessary resources existed to start BEVC and (3) understand the reasons why SBCH-I
and Boston Edison chose to start BEVC after discovering that BEVC was not a viable business.
CharactedZing the Network
In order to characterize the network, I relied on the interviews conducted with network
members. Initially, I intended on using the interviews with non-network as well, but non-network
members were hesitant to judge and evaluate Boston Edison, SBCH and SVMC. Most people
claimed that they had not worked with either organization long enough or had only met with them
once or twice.
In characterizing the network, the goal is to understand the extent to which trust and
reciprocity existed between SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC. Enduring networks are
characterized by a high degree of trust and reciprocity (Granovetter, 1985, Powell, 1990, Keyes et
al., 1996). In order to develop trust and reciprocity, it is crucial that organizations share common
objectives, exchange sensitive information about one another's organization, are in frequent
communication and are dependent on one another to accomplish their goals. As such, I asked
questions designed to ascertain the extent to which these qualities were present and present these
results in chapter 4.
Applying a Framework for Business Development
Timmons (1986) identified three elements necessary to start a business: the entrepreneur,
the business opportunity and resources. Chapter 5 applies this framework to the efforts of SBCH,
Boston Edison and SVMC to start BEVC. Information for this chapter derives from all of the
interviews.
The analysis in Chapter 5 corresponds to the elements Timmons (1986) argues are necessary
to start a business. First, I evaluate the roles of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC to understand the
extent to which an entrepreneur existed. Timmons provides the parameters for this analysis when
he defines an entrepreneur with the following qualities: committed, creative and experienced. Next,
I evaluate the presence or absence of a business opportunity. For Timmons, a business opportunity
is defined by a competitive environment in which a market exists to sell one's product at a profit. In
this case, the business opportunity will be analyzed by looking at the market and competition for
electric buses. Lastly, I look at the resources SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC brought to bear.
Timmons defines resources as the presence of a management team, start-up capital and a business
plan. I make use of the same categories in my analysis.
Why Start BF VC ?
In order to discuss the reasons SBCH and Boston Edison continued to start BEVC in spite
of the fact that it was not a viable business opportunity, I rely on interviews with both network and
non-network members. For the most part, I relied on the interviews conducted with members of
SBCH and Boston Edison. The themes I use to structure the chapter were expressed by both
members of SBCH and Boston Edison.
Bias
There are numerous sources of bias, some of which I feel have to do with the unique
character of the project, but others have to do with the methodology. Because SVMC was being
sued for fraud, there is the chance that network members were hesitant to elaborate on their
opinions for fear that this thesis could be submitted as a court document some time in the future.
Another potential bias has to do with the fact that I am asking people to talk about failure. Because
BEVC does not exist, it may have been difficult for people to criticize themselves and their actions.
In order to deal with these biases, I used the memos, letters and notes provided by Gallo to
corroborate the interviews. Because I worked for South Boston Community Housing, interviewees
from both Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Company may have felt that I
would regurgitate my findings to those involved with the project at SBCH. In order to manage this
worry, I tried to reassure everyone that these interviews were confidential, however, this does not
guarantee that they believed me.
Lastly, the fact that I was doing this case-study over two years after SBCH had been
approached by Boston Edison and almost a year after they had started working with SVMC to start
BEVC, there is no doubt that this case-study will miss some of the details and suffer from the
biased rccollection of those interviewed. More than once, those that I interviewed would say that
they had not thought about the case in a while, or have not thought about the case in quite some
time. Nonetheless, once people started talking, it was more of a challenge trying to stop them than
getting them to answer another question.
Chapter 3: Setting the Stage
Introduction
To some, including myself, it is not necessarily intuitive that an investor owned utility would
join forces with an electric vehicle manufacturing company and a community development
corporation to start a business. Nonetheless, from January 1995 to August 1996, South Boston
Community Housing, Boston Edison, and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation worked
together to start an electric vehicle manufacturing company in South Boston - Boston Electric
Vehicle Company (BEVC). In this chapter, I elaborate on the efforts of all three organizations to
start BEVC. For a chronology of events please refer to Appendix 3.
This chapter demonstrates that the project drastically changed from its initial concept to
what was brought to bankers and potential investors. Originally, it was conceived by the Chief
Engineer and Project Manager (Chief Engineer) in the Electric Vehicle Division at Boston Edison
that Alternative Vehicle Systems, a Tennessee based manufacturer of electric buses, would partner
with Solectria, a local research and development company known for converting gasoline powered
automobiles to electric-powered.1 This merger did not come to fruition. Instead, the banks and
other potential investors were introduced to Boston Electric Vehicle Company. BEVC was a
partnership between South Boston Community Housing and Specialty Manufacturing Company
formed to assemble electric buses in South Boston.
The Original Plan: A Merger and an Integrated Manufacturing Facility
In January of 1995, Don Walsh (Walsh), Director of the Economic Development
Department of Boston Edison approached Martin Nee (Nee), Executive Director of South Boston
Community Housing, Inc. to participate in the start-up of an electric vehicle manufacturing plant in
1 Due to a request by Boston Edison, I have concealed the identity of the Chief Engineer of the Electric Vehicle
Division in Boston Edison. For the rest of this case-study, this person will be referred to as the Chief Engineer.
South Boston. At the time, the Chief Engineer had already identified Alternative Vehicle Systems
(AVS) of Chattanooga, TN. and Solectria of Wilmington, MA. as partners for this project and had
developed a business concept that would form the basis for a proposal to raise a three-year grant
valued at $700,000 from the Federal Government through the Department of Health and Human
Services.
As pitched to SBCH, AVS and Solectria would bring their technology and management to,
"develop, market and manufacture electric vehicles during the three year grant period and construct
a 100,000 square foot integrated manufacturing facility." At the time, AVS assembled a 22 foot
electric-powered bus, while Solectria had gained notoriety for its successful conversion of a gasoline
powered vehicle into an all electric powered vehicle. SBCH was to lend AVS/ Solectria grant funds
from the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Community Services (OCS) in
order to begin initial manufacturing, while Boston Edison was to donate one of their buildings, as
well as 7.3 acres for a manufacturing facility. In addition, Boston Edison agreed to provide discount
electricity, while SBCH would devote its efforts to hiring, firing and training potential employees.
Additional financing was expected to come from the Bank of Boston at $ 6 million, while the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), a local funding intermediary, was expected to contribute
$200,000. This project was expected to generate 200 jobs over the three-year grant period, with
75% of the jobs being filled by low-income persons. This project is depicted in Figure 1 on the
following page.
The Role of Boston Edison's Economic Development Department
The Economic Development Department at Boston Edison, perhaps an unexpected
participant, was responsible for implementing the project conceived by the Chief Engineer in the
Figure 1: Original Plan to Produce Electric Buses in South Boston
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Source: Author.
Electric Vehicle Department. Because of current restructuring at Boston Edison, the relationship of
the Economic Development Department to the rest of Boston Edison is unclear, however, Mark
Ferri (Ferri), Senior Economist in the Economic Development Department, said that it is expected
that the Economic Development Department will report to the Headquarters Group. The
Headquarters Group consists of senior management.
According to a recent article prepared by Ferri (1996), the Department is responsible for
sustaining businesses and implementing strategies that will generate revenue for Boston Edison. As
a result, they work closely with the sales and marketing divisions at Boston Edison. Currently, some
of the services offered by the Economic Development Department to businesses throughout the
Greater Boston Metropolitan Area are: (1) assistance in locating industrial sites for businesses (free
of charge), (2) a 40% discount off base rates for customers who add 25 new manufacturing jobs and
add 150 kilowatts of new monthly demand and (3) corroborating with Community Development
Corporations to create jobs in their respective communities.
While the Economic Development Department within Boston Edison is the focus of this
thesis, from here on, they will be referred to as Boston Edison. Also, even though the Economic
Development Department consists of eight people, this analysis will focus on the work of Ferri and
Walsh because they consistently worked on this project for its duration. Walsh, the Director of the
Economic Development Department, has a history and commitment to working with Community
Development Corporations. Before coming to Boston Edison, Walsh was responsible for founding
Dorchester Bay Community Development Corporation. Ferri, originally hired as a special project
consultant at Boston Edison, is now the Senior Economist at Boston Edison and is responsible for
forging strategic alliances between businesses.
Raising OCS Grant Funds
With the financial support of Boston Edison, in February of 1995 SBCH hired Mr. Bob
Brandweine (Brandweine), President of Pofiy &iManagement Associates, to complete a Department
of Health and Human Services OCS (OCS) grant application. Brandweine worked with SBCH,
Boston Edison, as well as AVS to complete the OCS Grant application. Gallo expressed that
Brandweine was the right person for this project because of his reputation for raising funds for
economic development projects. In this case,. Brandweine felt that SBCH and Boston Edison
should apply for the $75,000 planning grant available to community organizations through the
Offices of Community Services. In spite of his opinion, Brandweine was urged to submit an
application for the full $700,000 available.
Six months after submitting the OCS grant application, Donna Shelala of Health and
Human Services announced that South Boston Community Housing had qualified for $600,000 in
OCS grant funds. With the announcement of the OCS Grant came a distinct change in the way
SBCH and Boston Edison worked together.
South Boston Community Housing
South Boston Community Housing (SBCH) is a community development corporation,
located in South Boston, Massachusetts. SBCH was formed by Nee, the current executive director,
in the late eighties. SBCH has a history of engaging in both affordable housing and economic
development projects. To date, SBCH has completed 47 units of affordable housing and will
complete approximately another 80 units of affordable housing this year. Although the electric
vehicle project was the largest economic development project SBCH had ever participated in, it was
not the first. Previous to this experience, SBCH administered micro-loans for the City of Boston.
Currently, SBCH is involved in another city-wide micro-loan program. Also, SBCH is working with
the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation and other community
development corporations throughout Massachusetts to investigate the opportunity to expand its
services into workforce development.
Currently, there are four people working at SBCH. Aside from Nee, SBCH consists of
Beverly Byer Gallo (Gallo), the Director of Development, Eliza Edelsburg, Project Manager and
Effie Parker, the Office Manager. Both Gallo and Nee will be the focus of this thesis from SBCI's
perspective.
The Search for More Money and Broad-Base Support
Up until SBCH had received notification that they were awarded the OCS Grant, SBCH
had not contributed much to this project, however, once SBCH received the funds, their
involvement changed. As opposed to working separately on this project, SBCH and Boston Edison
worked together debating and devising potential opportunities to make this project a reality. At this
time, SBCH and Boston Edison continued looking for investment funds from the public sector,
organized a steering committee for this project and laid the foundation for implementation.
In order to garner support for this project, SBCH and Boston organized a steering
committee in September 1995. Seventeen people were invited to attend a meeting in which steering
committee members could learn about the project and meet those involved. Of the seventeen
individuals invited, only eight attended. In a Chronology prepared by Gallo, there is a sense of
disappointment in the steering committee:
SBCH discovers that there is less interest and more skepticism surrounding
the venture than originally thought. The Steering Committee, it would
appear, was not going to be as powerful of a vehicle in promoting the EV
manufacturing concept/venture. SBCH takes time to reconsider their positions
and begin to regroup.
In spite of the apparent failure of the Steering Committee, support came from other
sources. Vic De Luca, Program Officer of the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation visited SBCH in
September of 1995 to consider SBCH's proposal for general operating support. In this visit, De
Luca recalls being greeted and introduced to the electric vehicle project by a diversity of individuals
and organizations. Among the participants were the staff and board members of SBCH, Boston
Edison staff, city officials and residents of the nearby BHA public development. The meeting was a
success; one month later, the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation awarded SBCH $30,000.
In another attempt to raise funds from a public foundation, South Boston Community
Housing, Inc. and Boston Edison met with Matt Thall (Thall), Program Director, of LISC. SBCH
and Boston Edison met with Thall to discuss the opportunity to receive a $35,000 in a recoverable
grant from LISC for planning and support purposes. Thall was introduced to the project by Walsh,
Nee, Gallo and Marty McDonough of the Public Facilities Department. Thall did not respond with
same enthusiasm as De Luca. In fact, Thall denied SBCH's request for grant funds.
Managing Adversity
Aside from raising funds, SBCH and Boston Edison were busy managing their relationship
with the Chief Engineer in the electric vehicle division in Boston Edison. The Chief Engineer was
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responsible for developing the relationships and industry contacts necessary to make this project a
reality. In fact, Ferri attributes the Chief Engineer with establishing the contacts with AVS and
Solectria, as well as providing the vision for the project in its initial stages. In the process of putting
the deal together with Solectria and AVS, it was discovered that the Chief Engineer had formed
Pristine, Inc. to perform research and development, manufacture and market electric vehicles.
In order to devote more time to Pristine, the Chief Engineer left Boston Edison. Instead of
working for Pristine, SBCH wanted to use money provided by Boston Edison to hire the Chief
Engineer as a consultant. Unfortunately, SBCH and the Chief Engineer could not come to terms
on an acceptable relationship. The Chief Engineer wanted SBCH to hire Pristine to be in charge of
the project, while SBCH did not see any reason to work with the three attorney's which composed
the rest of Pristine. Gallo's reaction to not being able to obtain the former Chief Engineer as a
consultant is summarized in a chronology she prepared:
SBCH meets with Pristine. Meeting does not go well. SBCH (Nee
and Gallo) are very up-front about their concerns about the Pristine
structure and questioned how these three attorneys could possibly
add anything to further our mission and objectives. The Pristine
lawyers, in tum, get very defensive and likewise question the validity
of a local housing developer as the proper entity to carry out such a
plan. The meeting crescendo came when the former Chief Engineer
announced that he had decided to commit to Pristine - if SBCH did
not hire Pristine, we did not get all of his proprietary knowledge and
industry contacts.
Unable to come to any solution , SBCH and Boston Edison decided to sever all business ties with
the former Chief Engineer at Boston Edison and attempt to implement the project without him.
Redefining the Scope of the Project
Because the former Chief Engineer at Boston Edison was a liaison to the electric vehicle
industry, his departure meant that there was a void in leadership that needed to be filled. Both Ferri
and Gallo were asked to fill this void and make something happen in South Boston.
One of the first decisions made by Gallo and Ferri was to pursue a partnership with SVMC
and Solectria instead of AVS and Solectria. To say that Gallo and Ferri made a conscientious
decision to pursue SVMC over AVS is misleading; Gallo says that, in reviewing documents, it was
discovered that AVS possessed licenses from SVMC and that SVMC really owned the technology.
As a result, both SBCH and Boston Edison decided to pursue an arrangement with SVMC.
Initial Introductions
In what became a series of trips to Downey, California, Gallo first met and introduced
herself to Duffy of SVMC in December 1995. In her initial trip, Gallo confronted a small company,
that produced electric buses, as she put it, "from the ground-up". SVMC, assembled their buses
entirely by themselves. This includes assembling the chassis, manufacturing and attaching the frame,
as well as painting the bus. Unlike other companies that may strip an already pre-built bus of all of
its internal combustion components, SVMC built an electric bus from raw materials.
Throughout January of 1996, Gallo compiled substantial information on SVMC. Based in
Downey, California, SVMC has been in the business of designing and manufacturing specialty
transportation equipment since 1983. While they have never mass produced an electric bus, those
within the electric vehicle industry consider SVMC to be pioneers in the electric bus industry -- 52
of the 87 electric buses in service in the US were designed and developed by SVMC (BEVC
Business Plan, 1996). SVMC now offers a diverse and growing product line. Among the products
offered are a 31 ft. electric powered bus and a 22 foot electric shuttle. In the future, SVMC aspires
to produce an electric powered cargo van and school bus. 2
2 Information on SVMC's future goals was provided by Newton Montano. Vice-President of Operations at SVMC,
in an interview conducted on January 20, 1997.
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Convinced that SVMC offered an impressive product line and substantial experience in the
electric vehicle industry, all parties agreed to work together to start an electric vehicle company in
South Boston.
The Framework for a Working Relationship
Because Duffy did not have a business plan, Gallo assumed responsibility for designing the
company that would start in South Boston. Before this could be done, SBCH, SVMC and Boston
agreed to a framework that would serve as the basis for the business plan developed by Gallo. The
agreement, known as the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed on January 26, 1996, "set out
the principles which will form the basis of a contractual and investment arrangement between
South Boston Community Housing Inc. of Boston, Massachusetts and Specialty Vehicle
Manufacturing Corporation." '
The MOA explicitly detailed the ownership arrangement for a developing company,
licensing guidelines, investment and financing, as well as royalty guidelines. In the MOA, SVMC
stockholders are offered 80% ownership, while stockholders of a subsidiary created by SBCH are
offered 20% ownership. Also, BEVC is offered an exclusive license to manufacture a 31 foot
electric powered bus to a minimum of 50% of the domestic market developed by SVMC. Another
product that BEVC had rights to was an electric powered delivery van. In order to obtain the
license to this product, BEVC had to secure five purchase orders for SVMC. Upon the fifth order,
BEVC would receive a similar license as the one issued for the 31 foot bus. In terms of investment
and financing SBCH agreed to invest $400,000 and also raise $3 million for start-up costs. For
royalties, SVMC agreed to 4.5% of the vehicle selling price, with payments starting in the business'
second year of operation. The wholly-owned subsidiary created by SBCH, Boston Alternative
3 This quote derives from the MOA dated January 26, 1996. The MOA was signed by Nee of SBCH and Duffy of
SVMC.
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Transportation Manufacturing Partnership (BATMP), was to receive 2.5%"o of the price of the sale
of every vehicle they secured. Details of the MOA are depicted in Table I on the following page.I
With all parties agreeing to the terms in the MOA, Gallo worked closely with Duffy, Ferri
and other technical staff to complete a business plan.
Putting the Business Plan Together: One Surprise After Another
In what was originally intended to be a "cut and paste" job, in which Gallo would work with
Duffy to amend his current business plan, in the end, entailed Gallo developing a business plan
from scratch. In working on the business plan, Gallo confronted many difficulties. Gallo discovered
that Duffy possessed a limited understanding of the electric vehicle industry and his competitors.
In addition, he did not have an adequate business plan nor did he maintain audited financial
statements.
In dealing with these obstacles, Gallo assumed responsibility for developing the business
plan. In so doing, she had to be creative in integrating limited information from Duffy, market
research from Ferri and technical information from members of the Electric Vehicle Division in
Boston Edison. Gallo did receive financial information on SVMC, but it was not in the form of
financial statements, but a stack of numbers generated by a friend based in Madison, Wisconsin. In
her drive to obtain this information, Gallo learned that Duffy was in such financial distress that he
was on the verge of declaring bankruptcy.'
4 In early documents, Boston Alternative Transportation Manufacturing Partnership was referred to as the Electric
Transportation Consortium.
5 In a letter dated August 12, 1996 from Fred Elder, Don Duffy's accountant. Elder acknowledges that SBCH and
Boston Edison were made aware of Duffy's financial distress in the "first week of 1996".
Table 1: The First Memorandum of Agreement
Organization Ownership Product
200%0 ownership
)y stockholders
80% ownership
by stockholders
N /A. Invest $400,000 into BEVC.
and raise $ 3 Million
License 31 ft. electric
bus, cargo van and
school bus.
Receive $500,000 up-front.
Receive $ 3 million for work-
in-progress andstart-up.
2.5 'o of the price of
every sale secured by
ETC
4.5o of the vehicle
selling price
Innning in year 2
Source: Author.
BATMP
SVMC
Financing Royalties
Working with a Company in Distress
Weighing the potential ramifications of working with Duffy, Nee and Walsh decided to
continue working with him. The consequences of working with Duffy, as summarized by Mr. Bob
Pitts, Duffy's lawyer, in a letter dated February 9, 1996 are two-fold. First, if it is found that SVMC
transferred assets to SBCH and Boston Edison below market value, the agreement could be
revoked. Second, if Duffy files Chapter 11 his creditors have the opportunity to competitively bid
for his technology. Gallo believes that SBCH and Boston Edison should have stopped the project
at this time, however, she argues that Nee and Walsh wanted to continue working with Duffy in
hopes that he would amend his finances if he could be shown that a deal was imminent. With that
understanding, Gallo created Boston Electric Vehicle Company.
Boston Electric Vehicle Company
Composed of many of the elements in the MOA, BEVC's mission was to produce a 31 ft.
electric bus in South Boston for municipalities and other interested organizations. Ownership was
split between SVMC and Boston Alternative Transportation Manufacturing Partnership, a for-
profit subsidiary created by SBCH. The seven member board was supposed to consist of four
persons appointed by SVMC shareholders and remaining board members were appointed by
SBCH. In terms of financing, $ 6 million was the target emanating from a blend of public and
private sources. Of the $ 6 million, $ 1.3 million was expected to come from a private lender, $ 2.2
million from equity investors and $ 2.5 million from the Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program. For
management, the business plan says: "Staffing of BEVC's initial management team pulls from
SVMC's existing staff ... It is BEVC's intent to bring in a professional manger to assume the
position of president, or CEO within the first year." (BEVC Business Plan, 1996).
The Quest For Capital
Armed with a $600,00 OCS grant and the desire to see this project come to fruition, the
BEVC business plan was submitted to both the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment
Center for funding. In total, BEVC asked for $3.8 million from both organizations -- $2.5 million
from the Boston Empowerment Center and $1.3 million from the Bank of Boston. At the Bank of
Boston, Nee and Walsh contacted Mr. Mike Glavin who referred them to Mr. Robert Ocko and
Mr. Joe Pellegrino who are responsible for reviewing and providing loans to small businesses. At
the Boston Empowerment Center, Nee contacted Mr. Frank Tocci, Assistant Director of Financial
Services, to review the business plan. Neither organization was willing to lend money to BEVC
based on what they read in the business plan. Both organizations requested SVMC's historical
financial statements for two reasons. First, they needed to be convinced that Duffy was a credible
partner for this deal. Second, they wanted proof that this business could be profitable. Knowing
that this information did not exist, SBCH and SVMC tried packaging this deal in other ways to
make it more attractive to the banks. Also, both the Bank of Boston and the Boston
Empowerment Center wanted to see a stakeholder with substantial equity in the business to absorb
some of the risk.
Managing Distress: Devising Alternative Deals
Given the constraints posed by Duffy's distress, SBCH and Boston Edison tried many
different things to respond to the needs of the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment
Center. They tried to find another entrepreneur, work with Duffy's creditors and raise equity
capital. Unfortunately, none of these alternatives worked.
In trying to recruit another entrepreneur to run BEVC, SBCH relied on the resources of
Boston Edison and personal networks. Although many people responded, according to Gallo
nobody was willing to put their careers on the line and try to start BEVC.
Although an entrepreneur could not be found, there was still hope the project would
survive as SBCH and Boston Edison were working with Mr. Lanny Johnson, counsel for Subaru of
America in their development deals in the United States, to have Subaru invest in an equity position
in BEVC. Gallo expressed that working with Subaru was good for the project because they would
accept a lower return in exchange for access to the technology and the opportunity to get involved
with electric vehicles. According to Gallo, unlike the other manufacturers in the auto industry,
Subaru had yet to get involved in the electric vehicle industry. To date, SBCH and Boston Edison
have not heard from Subaru. Gallo feels that the attention SBCH and Boston Edison received had
more to do with the fact that Johnson is an environmentalist and wanted to see the project happen
and the fact that he is married to one of Gallo's close friends.
Unable to meet the demands of the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center,
options were limited and morale was at an all-time low. Momentum suddenly shifted in the early
part of May 1996 when Feri introduced the ACL/AAI project. The ACL/AAI project was
designed to demonstrate that SVMC's technology was viable and that demand for electric buses
existed.
ACL/AAI, located in California, was hired by SVMC to assemble several electric buses.
Unable to pay ACL/AAI for their work, ACL/AAI never completed all of the buses. Capitalizing
on the experience gained by ACL/AAI, Feri designed a project in which ACL/AAI would transfer
their work-in-progress and assist in the assembly of buses in South Boston. In return, ACL/ Al
would be repaid with BEVC funding.
Even though the President of ACL/AAI, Mr. Tom Wurzel, was willing to work with SBCI
and Boston Edison, the deal was never implemented. Ferri expressed a number of reasons for the
project's failure. First, the ACL/AAI project did not solve any of the fundamental problems
inherent in BEVC - Duffy was still on the verge of bankruptcy. Second, Ferri felt that raising the
capital needed to obtain the technology and expertise of ACL/AAL, about $600,000, was
impossible given the amounts already needed to finance BEVC.
The Second Memorandum of Agreement
While the first MOA expired, Duffy ventured to Boston in the beginning of July of 1996 to
work on the second MOA. Initially, Duffy was still clinging to the idea that BEVC could become a
reality. After days of negotiations a second MOA was drafted, however, it was never signed. The
second MOA was substantially different than the first MOA. The main differences had to do with
the financing of the project. Duffy still wanted a $500,000 technology transfer fee, but agreed to
finance it over time, such that he would receive $125,000 over four years. Also, the ownership was
drastically different. In this case, SVMC shareholders were to own only 35% of BEVC, 25% by
BATMP, 10% by Boston Edison, and the remaining 30% to be reserved for future investors. Not
only had Duffy reduced ownership, but allowed his technology transfer fee to be dispersed over
four years. While Duffy may have appeared to be making compromises and ready to rethink his role
in BEVC, Boston Edison had hired an outside consultant to evaluate the BEVC business plan and
their participation in general.
Evaluating the Business Opportunity
In June of 1996, Boston Edison hired Amy Auerback to evaluate the BEVC business plan
and develop a business plan for the Economic Development Department. In reviewing the
business plan and performing what she calls the necessary due diligence of Duffy, Ms. Auerback
argues that Duffy is not capable of running his business and is not a suitable partner for this
venture. At first, she confronted the same difficulties as Gallo did in composing the business plan -
she could not obtain reliable information from Duffy on his company. Also, Auerback discovered
that Duffy owed money, not only to ACL/AAI, but to many other companies. In addition to this
debt, Duffy failed to fulfill contracts to municipalities or other nonprofit agencies. Although
nobody knew how Auerback would respond to BEVC and Duffy, it was sure to be negative once
she received news that Duffy was being sued for fraud by CALSTART.
The Final Straw
CALSTART, a consortium of electric utilities and private companies devoted to the
promotion of electric vehicles, notified both Boston Edison and SBCH that they intended to sue
Duffy for fraud, the day Duffy had left Boston after working on the second MOA. CALSTART
had contracted with Duffy to produce an electric powered school bus. In order to produce the bus,
CALSTART provided Duffy with the financial resources to produce a prototype. Instead of
producing a prototype, Duffy had nothing for CALSTART. In order to recoup their funds,
CALSTART decided to sue Duffy.
With this information and fear that Boston Edison and SBCH would be held accountable,
Auerback advised both Boston Edison and SBCH to sever all business ties with Duffy. Heeding her
advice, on August 2, 1996, SBCH and Boston Edison sent letters to Duffy expressing their desire to
discontinue business negotiations with him.
Pushing on
Working on the project, it was difficult not to see this day coming, nonetheless, we were all
somber when those letters were sent. Initially, Boston Edison and SBCH tried to revive the project
by working with other electric vehicle companies. For instance, Gallo and Ferr identified Bus
Manufacturing Incorporated (BMI), an electric bus manufacturing company located in Northern
California as a potential business partner. In a visit to California, Ferri and Auerback found that
BMI was not manufacturing any buses. As a result, Boston Edison and SBCH decided not to
pursue a business relationship with BMI. In addition to BMI, South Boston and Boston Edison
were looking at the potential of developing partnerships with other businesses, but the outcome
was similar - either the business was not worthy or the opportunity was not there.
Conclusion
For those involved in this project, including myself, there was a genuine optimism that this
project would work, not necessarily that it should work, but that somehow and some way
everything would fall into place. Unfortunately, that was not the case -- after a year and eight
months, from January 1995 to August 1996, there was no BEVC and no real hope for its
resurrection. Despite the efforts of SBCH and Boston Edison, they were unable to convince
investors and raise the funds to capitalize BEVC. The next chapter begins the analysis to
understand the influence SBCH, BEVC and SVMC had on the start-up process. Specifically, the
next chapter characterizes the network consisting of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC.
Chapter 4: Characterizing the Network
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the working relationships of South Boston
Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation.
Information for this chapter derives from interviews conducted solely with network members.
Network members include Gallo and Nee of SBCH, Walsh and Ferri of Boston Edison's
Economic Development Department and Duffy and Montano of Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing
Corporation
Network theorists argue that trust and reciprocity are the glue which binds organizations
together (Powell, 1990, Keyes et al., 1996, Hansen, 1996). To the extent that trust and reciprocity
exist, naturally, the more that is present, the better organizations work together and endure periods
of adversity. On the other hand, when trust and reciprocity do not exist, networks quickly dissolve.
In order to measure the extent to which trust and reciprocity existed between SBCH, Boston
Edison and SVMC, I characterize there relationships along the following dimensions: common
objectives, shared information, frequency of communication, degree of dependency and the
existence of a formal relationships. Networks that are categorized with a high degree of trust and
reciprocity are those organizations that share a common motivation for working on a project
together, exchange sensitive information on their organization with one another, are frequently in
communication and are dependent on one another (Granovetter, 1985, Keyes et al., 1996, Powell,
1990).
Why Work Together?
Trust and reciprocity develop in environments where organizations share a common set of
objectives for working on a particular project. According to Granovetter (1985) the more objectives
that organizations share, the more likely it is that a network will endure periods of adversity. Also,
by understanding why organizations work together, one can predict why networks dissolve. For
instance, organizations that unite solely to elect a particular candidate for political office are likely to
dissolve once the election is over. On the other hand, if those same organizations had not only
united to elect a candidate for political office, but advocate for the passage of particular legislation,
they are less likely to break-up if their candidate loses because they still have another reason to
maintain the network. By looking at the motivations of SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC in
working on this project, I hope to develop a similar type of insight.
Creating Jobs
To those involved in this project at both Boston Edison and SBCH, BEVC represented an
opportunity to create manufacturing jobs for low-income and working-class residents. While Nee
and Gallo felt that BEVC would provide real job opportunities to South Boston residents who had
endured the downsizing of the shipbuilding industry in South Boston, Walsh felt that this
opportunity provided jobs for people in a disappearing sector - manufacturing. Creating
manufacturing jobs is important to Walsh because he feels that the service sector does not offer
wages to raise a family.
The Role of Capital
Both SBCH and SVMC agreed to start BEVC because they perceived an opportunity to
raise money for their own organizations in the process. Nee feels that the OCS Grant is a
tremendous resource that would be useful in future development projects. As a result, the
opportunity to gain access to these funds was deserving of organizational attention. Also, the fact
that Boston Edison paid for the consultant to complete the OCS Grant and that Boston Edison
subsidized Gallo's work made joining this project feasible. Similar to Nee, Duffy got involved in this
project as a unique opportunity to gain access to start-up funds, however, Duffy needed these funds
to bail himself out of financial distress.
The Economic Development Department at Boston Edison was focused on the
opportunity to profit from starting BEVC. In their mission, pursuing revenue generating projects
for Boston Edison is central. To the Economic Development Department, revenues would come
in the form of increased electricity use both from the addition of a manufacturing company, but
also from the charging of electric buses.
Location
Both Gallo and Nee attribute Boston Edison's desire to work with SBCH to location. In
the original OCS Grant proposal, Boston Edison was going to donate a site at 621 E. First Street in
South Boston to spawn an integrated manufacturing facility. Importantly, if Boston Edison had
identified an alternate site, then both Gallo and Nee believe that SBCH would never have been
approached to get involved in this project. Besides the location for the manufacturing facility, Fern
believes that there are other qualities to South Boston that made it attractive for this project. Some
of these qualities include the fact that Boston Edison has generators in South Boston, the Mayor
lives in South Boston and many political leaders emanate from South Boston.
Entironment
Surprisingly, environmental protection or preservation was an explicit motivation of only
SBCH. One of the attractive elements of this project to Nee was the fact that the product, an
electric bus, in his opinion, minimizes tailpipe emissions. Since South Boston suffers from the
highest rate of air born carcinogens as compared to any other city in the Commonwealth, Nee felt
that this project would in some ways contribute to the improvement of South Boston's air quality.
An Opportunity to Grow
Both SVMC and SBCH felt that BEVC offered the opportunity to grow. Duffy mentioned
that one of the main reasons he got involved with this project was to expand the market for electric
buses. Currently, he feels that the Northeast market is untapped and BEVC would enable him to be
a first-mover in the area.
For SBCH, BEVC was a platform to expand SBCH's services to workforce development.
The role envisioned by Nee is something I spent the summer developing. Essentially what I
created is best summarized by Nee in his analogy to the "triage" service hospitals provide. Nee saw
an opportunity for SBCH to screen and assess potential job candidates, sending qualified individuals
to the electric vehicle company and other individuals to training and work opportunities throughout
Boston.
Reputation
Another important goal of Boston Edison's Economic Development Department is to
enhance Boston Edison's image. According to Feri, these investments are called reputational
capital. By supporting and investing in the start-up of BEVC, Boston Edison could take credit for
creating manufacturing jobs and protecting the environment. In return, Boston Edison hopes to
prosper with a positive image in not only South Boston, but other neighborhoods as well.
Personal Responsibility
Only one person claims responsibility for her organization's involvement. Gallo feels that
SBCH remained involved in this project because she was willing to assume responsibility for the
project and do the work. This is important because nobody else said that they were committed to
this project personally.
Community Development
For Ferri, an objective of the project is to contribute to the community revitalization of
South Boston. In contrast, neither Nee nor Gallo expresses community revitalization as priority,
however, De Luca believes that this community revitalization is an important mission of SBCH. In
his visit to South Boston, De Luca feels that Nee supported this project to distract those interested
in putting a stadium in South Boston. By bringing an electric vehicle company to the area, De Luca
understood that Nee could demonstrate that manufacturing still has a role in South Boston's
economy. This makes sense given the recent outrage Nee expressed to the New England Patriot's
desire to move to South Boston.
Sunival
Everyone involved, or more precisely, those who were aware of Duffy's financial situation
expressed an opinion that he was involved in this project to bail his company out of financial
distress. Organizations and individuals expressing this opinion are SBCH, Boston Edison, Boston
Empowerment Center, and Amy Auerback. Of note, SBCH and Boston Edison were convinced
that his financial distress was attractive, in the sense that it may provide Duffy with the motivation
to see this company come into existence.
Dependency
SBCH, SVMC and Boston Edison depended on one another for this project to succeed.
Each organization brought a necessary component to this project: SVMC brought the technology
and management expertise, SBCH brought community support and Boston Edison brought both
the financial support and reputation to sustain SBCH and SVMC while they tried to start BEVC.
Other organizations, such as the Boston Empowerment Center, Bank of Boston and the Jessie
Smith Noyes Foundation felt that each SBCH, SVMC and Boston Edison needed one another to
implement this project.
Gallo feels that SBCH could not have gotten as far as they had without the help of Boston
Edison. First, Boston Edison funded Gallo's position for a year and provided the credibility
necessary to meet with potential equity investors and players in the electric vehicle industry.
Without SBCH, Boston Edison could never have raised OCS Grant funds for this project. Lastly,
without SVMC there would never have been a project because the technology would not have
existed.
While SBCH and Boston Edison admit that SVMC was a crucial component to this project,
because of Duffy's financial troubles, there is a general feeling that SVMC depended on SBCH and
Boston Edison more than they would have liked. Because Duffy was in financial trouble and did
not maintain adequate financial records, both the Bank of Boston and Boston Empowerment
Center did not feel that they could lend money to BEVC. First, Tocci made it clear that the Boston
Empowerment Center could not lend money to BEVC because of the worry that the funds would
go straight to his creditors. Secondly, because he did not possess historical financial records, it was
impossible to verify that an electric vehicle company could pay back its debt or grow. As a result, it
seems that Duffy needed Boston Edison and SBCH to start BEVC; SBCH and Boston Edison
brought the credibility and connections necessary to get the project heard.
Communication
Hansen ( 1996) found that the more frequently organizations communicated with one
another, the stronger were the ties between them. Both Boston Edison and SBCH were in constant
communication with one another, however, both organizations do not feel that they were in
contact with Duffy as often. Specifically, Fern and Gallo report that they were on the phone with
one another every day, often times several times a day. On the other hand, Fern and Gallo do not
feel that they had the same communication with Duffy. While composing the business plan, Gallo
was on the phone with Duffy almost every day, however, once the business plan was complete,
both Gallo and Fern report that communication with Duffy deteriorated. Both feel that when the
business plan was completed, the only time they heard from Duffy was when he was asking for
more money, trying to apply pressure to get the project going or wanting to find out what was
happening.
Formal Agreement
SBCH, SVMC and Boston Edison, with the help of Brandweine, developed a Memorandum
of Agreement, which both SBCH and SVMC signed on January 26, 1996. Nee described the MOA
as a "promise to promise something". As described in the previous chapter, the MOA described
the royalty stream, technology transfer fee, ownership structure and products that would be
available to BEVC. For the most part, the MOA served as a framework for the BEVC business
plan. More importantly, it was an agreement among all three organizations to commit resources and
proceed in a particular direction if BEVC were to be implemented.
Shared Information
Because SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC were working together to start an electric bus
manufacturing company, they depended on Duffy to provide financial information on his business
and share his expertise on the electric vehicle industry. Unfortunately, Gallo had a terrible time in
obtaining this information from Duffy. In soliciting financial and market information from Duffy,
Gallo found that he did not have audited financial statements, nor did he have an understanding of
his competitors. In order to generate information on the electric vehicle industry, Gallo had to rely
on other resources such as trade journals, organizations which sponsor the development of electric
vehicles and the research of Ferri. For financial information, Gallo did receive a stack of
spreadsheets, but they were not in a standard format for analysis. Further, after having to wrestle
with Duffy for this information, she found out that he was in financial distress and on the verge of
filing bankruptcy . Thus, by not providing financial records or sharing his viewpoints on the
electric vehicle industry, Duffy was hiding his financial distress and the fact that he could not
manage SVMC.
Conclusion
In terms of functionality, the network created by SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC in
many ways makes a lot of sense. Boston Edison brought the credibility and financial resources to
sustain the participation of SBCH and SVMC. SVMC brought a reputation for being a pioneer in
the electric bus industry, proven technology and experience in running an electric bus company.
Unfortunately, Duffy did not live up to his reputation -he was on the verge of financial distress,
unable to maintain adequate financial records and did not know much about the electric vehicle
industry. SBCH was attractive because of their potential to attract public funds to finance BEVC.
Unfortunately, dependency is not enough to build trust and reciprocity, elements such as shared
objectives, communication and shared information are important.
In looking at the shared objectives of the organizations involved, what is most interesting
about the list of objectives is that it does not include starting BEVC - not one person or
organization explicitly stated a "passion" to start BEVC. What this suggests is that no one was really
interested in starting BEVC, just capitalizing on the outcomes of this business. For instance, all
three organizations were using BEVC as a means to generate revenue for themselves. For SBCH,
starting BEVC would have meant obtaining the OCS grant funds and providing jobs for South
Boston residents. To Boston Edison, BEVC provided an opportunity to generate additional
revenues and enhancing their reputation by supporting economic development. In reviewing the
MOA, it is clear that Duffy was using BEVC to bail himself out of financial distress. By starting
BEVC, he would obtain a $500,000 technology transfer fee, ownership in BEVC, and a royalty
stream.
Even though Boston Edison, SBCH and SVMC did not display the characteristics of a
network with a high degree of trust and reciprocity, I have only begun to explain why they could
not start BEVC in South Boston. In the next chapter, I extend this analysis by applying a
framework for business development developed by Timmons (1986). I use the framework to
understand the degree to which an entrepreneur was present, a business opportunity actually existed
and evaluate whether or not Boston Edison, SBCH and SVMC brought the necessary resources to
bear to start BEVC.
Chapter 5: The Bare Necessities
Introduction
Timmons (1986) has developed a framework for analyzing business start-ups. In general,
Timmons argues that there are three essential ingredients to start a business: the entrepreneur, the
opportunity and resources. This chapter will apply each one of these elements to the efforts of
Boston Edison, SBCH and SVMC to start BEVC.
Entrepreneurship
Timmons (1986) defines an entrepreneur by the following characteristics: experienced,
creative and committed. While these adjectives do not necessarily describe all entrepreneurs,
Timmons points out that these qualities are some of the most prominent across all entrepreneurs.
Also, Timmons is not explicit as to whether or not it makes any difference whether or not one
person demonstrates all of the characteristics or if organizations can pool their resources, talents
and experience together. By looking at the roles of Boston Edison, SBCH and SVMC, I will
evaluate the extent to which an entrepreneur was present or whether or not these three
organizations pooled the necessary qualities together to be considered "entrepreneurial".
Boston Edison
Boston Edison provided the commitment, support and creativity to sustain this project.
Walsh says that Boston Edison deserves all of the credit for organizing the project and bringing
SBCH and SVMC to the table. Both Gallo and Duffy agree that they would not have been involved
in this project had Boston Edison not taken the initiative and offered financial support. In its
beginning stages, the Chief Engineer of the Electric Vehicle Division was responsible for finding
electric vehicle companies that would be willing to move to South Boston. Originally, the Chief
Engineer had preliminary agreements from Solectria and AVS that they would merge and start an
integrated manufacturing facility in South Boston. Also, Boson Edison provided SBCH with
$100,000 to pay for a consultant to complete the OCS Grant application, allow Gallo to devote a
substantial amount of her time to this project and to provide SVMC with a loan to start BEVC.
Also, Boston Edison provided SVMC with $80,000.
Aside from developing the project and pledging financial support, both Gallo and Nee
expressed that Boston Edison brought credibility to this deal because of their presence in the
electric utility industry. To Gallo and Nee this was important because they did not believe that any
CDC, especially SBCH, would be taken seriously if they approached banks looking for money had
Boston Edison not been involved. De Luca of the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundations admits that
Boston Edison's participation "provided cover for SBCH" and was a motivating factor for
supporting the project..
Throughout the project's life, Fern devoted much of his time in working with Gallo
developing the business plan and devising alternate deals to enable BEVC to become a reality. For
instance, when it had become apparent that Duffy's financial distress was insurmountable, Ferr
looked for alternative ways of obtaining the electric bus technology. In doing research, Feri found
out that Duffy owed money to ACL/AAI, a company based in California which had been hired by
Don Duffy to assemble buses. Because Duffy could not pay, ACL/AAI did not return inventory
and work-in-progress. Ferri felt that he could craft a deal that would divert some of the loans to
ACL/AAI in exchange for the work-in-progress.
South Boston Community Housing
Originally, Walsh thought that SBCII would use the OCS grant funds to invest in BEVC,
recruit a local labor force and provide community support. Nee was comfortable with this role, but
admits that SBCH was much more involved than initially planned. Gallo wrote the business plan for
BEVC and with Boston Edison tried to raise funds from the Boston Empowerment Center and
Bank of Boston.
Nee attributes the increased involvement to the OCS Grant funds. Up until the money
arrived, Nee felt that the role of SBCH was limited to vocal support. With the OCS grant funds
there was motivation to assume more of an active role to ensure that the OCS funds were not
squandered, however, Gallo argues that SBCH would never have devoted time to composing the
business plan and searching for financing had the Chief Engineer of Boston Edison's electric
vehicle department continued working on the project.
Even though SBCH received the OCS grant funds, the Chief Engineer was still responsible
for working with the electric vehicle companies and bringing them to South Boston. When the
Chief Engineer left the project, there was a gap in leadership - no longer was there anyone to work
with companies such as Solectria and AVS and to facilitate fundraising. Gallo filled this void and
devoted her efforts to writing the business plan with Duffy. Also, SBCH obtained a lease for a
building located on the Marine Industrial Park.' Working with the Boston Redevelopment
Authority and the Public Facilities Department, Nee and Gallo negotiated a three-year lease for a
building on the Marine Industrial Park.
In terms of recruiting potential workers, SBCH never had the opportunity to demonstrate
whether or not this was something that they could really do. I was hired to help develop an
employment and training component for this venture. The SBCH proposal involved the
development of a for-profit subsidiary of BEVC that would recruit, screen and train potential
6 In Chapter 3, I mentioned the use of a Boston Edison building located in South Boston at 621 East First Street.
Unfortunately, this building was not available for the BEVC project. As a result, the Subaru facility located in the
Marine Industrial Park was chosen as an alternate site. SBCH obtained a lease on the Subaru facility with the help
of Mr. Marty McDonough at the Boston Public Facilities Department.
employees. The organization would be called Boston Alternative Transportation Manufacturing
Partnership.
Speialty V ehicle Manufacturing Corporation
Ideally, Boston Edison and SBCH expected that SVMC would be responsible for more
than licensing their bus technology to BEVC, but raise the necessary funds to implement BEVC, as
well as train workers and manage the new company. Nee believes that once it became apparent that
SBCH and Boston Edison were doing their best to find a management team for the Northeast
operations, Duffy fixated on maximizing his royalty stream and technology transfer fee. Feri
corroborates Nee's impressions of Duffy, except his opinions are stronger. He does not believe
that Duffy ever really played an active role in this project. Feri argues that Duffy was never
involved in the planning and strategizing -- he was only interested in talking to Boston Edison when
he needed money.
Duffy does not seem to agree with any of these allegations; this seems to be because he had
a different impression of his role. His position is that his role was to bring the technology and
management capable of starting a company in Boston. In response to people's opinions that he did
not put the effort into starting a business, Duffy maintains that there was little he could do because
SBCH could not raise the necessary funding to capitalize BEVC.
Conclusion
Whether or not they are viewed individually or collectively, SBCH, Boston Edison and
SVMC did not possess the qualities of an entrepreneur starting an electric bus manufacturing plant.
As demonstrated by the time, energy and effort they devoted to starting BEVC, SBCH and Boston
Edison were clearly committed to starting BEVC, but lacked experience in manufacturing electric
buses. In order to make up for this lack of experience, SBCH and Boston Edison recruited SVMC.
Unfortunately, Duffy did not know how to run a successful business and could not provide the
experience the Bank of Boston and Boston Empowerment Center expected of an entrepreneur.
The Opportunity
Timmons argues that a genuine business opportunity hinges on many factors: the nature of
competition, the market, profits and the amount of risk. Instead of trying to go through each one
of these categories, I would like to rely on the words of bankers and experts in the field in defining
whether or not there was a business opportunity. I expect to demonstrate the extent to which other
people believed that there was a business opportunity. Of all the people asked to review the
business plan, there is a general consensus that there is no market for electric buses. Among the
reasons cited are: inadequate technology, lack of competition and lack of orders.
Technology
Currently, the technology associated with electric buses is not sufficient for electric buses to
compete with diesel powered buses, nor are electric buses capable of enduring in the Northeast.
Electric buses depend on batteries for fuel. The problems with these batteries are numerous,
especially when one considers using them in the Northeast.
One of the main problems with the batteries has to do with their weight. Montano, the
Vice-President of Operations at SVMC believes that designing the buses and balancing the weight
of the batteries has been a challenge. Another issue has to do with the range of the buses. Estimates
of range vary from source to source and heavily depends on the environment. The Electric
Transportation Vehicle Institute reports that electric buses can last anywhere from 40 to 90 miles
depending on climate and terrain. Importantly, the Institute points out that in colder environments,
such as the Northeast, this range is not attainable with buses powered solely by batteries. These
limitations, while not necessarily insurmountable, have meant that electric bus companies have
looked to developing hybrid buses as an alternative. For instance, Montano is currently developing a
bus at SVMC that has both an internal combustion engine and batteries. The internal combustion
engine is smaller than what would be found in any other bus and is only used when battery power is
low.
Competition
Currently, the competition within the electric bus industry is meager. Outside of the electric
bus industry, electric buses compete for contracts with municipalities with the likes of Bluebird and
Thomasbuilt - established producers of diesel powered buses. Powell of the Electric Transportation
vehicle Institute agrees. For any contract, there may be two companies bidding, but it is more likely
that there will only be one company. The reason for this is the fact that each company produces a
different size bus - AVS produces a 22 foot bus, SVMC produces a 31 foot bus and Bluebird is
working on a 35 foot bus. Powell does expect competition to increase. According to Powell, many
bus companies, which focus on diesel buses, are in the process of designing electric buses. These
companies include, Thomasbuilt, Orion and Nova.
Explaining the dearth of competition relates to the poor technology of the electric buses.
Because the technology is not adequate, municipalities are hesitant to purchase electric buses. As a
result, the only way for a company to survive is through government subsidy. There are a number
of organizations that have been developed to support fledgling electric vehicle companies. In the
Northeast, there is the Northeast Alternative Vehicle Consortium and in California, there is
CALSTART. The purpose of these organizations is to sponsor research and demonstration projects
to promote awareness of electric vehicles and advancement of the technology. Importantly,
Auerback points out that the fact that industry is subsidized and that established bus producers are
hesitant to enter the market is a strong signal that profits are not there.
Mlarket
The market for electric buses is thin. Municipalities provide the demand for buses. The
factors that are important to municipalities when they purchase buses are quality , cost and service.
Webb, of the Northeast Alternative Vehicle Consortium, reports that municipalities are under
pressure to purchase buses that are simultaneously durable and cheap. Further, they need to know
that the company that they are purchasing vehicles from will provide service support if there are
ever any problems with the vehicles. This combination of quality, cost and service automatically
disqualifies electric buses and electric bus companies from competing with manufacturers of diesel-
powered buses. Electric buses are not only more expensive than diesel powered buses, but are not
comparable to diesel powered buses; electric buses cannot travel as far as diesel buses and have
demonstrated their susceptibility to malfunction. Unfortunately, because electric buses are small and
under-capitalized they do not have the resources to provide the same service as a diesel bus
manufacturer.
Resources
For Timmons, resources include the availability of start-up capital, the business plan and
individuals interested in joining the management team. In this section, I hope to touch on these
issues as the Bank of Boston and Boston Empowerment Center grappled with them. Both of these
organizations reviewed the business plan and met with representatives from either one or all of the
participating organizations. Both the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center felt
that BEVC's request for $5 million was unreasonable given the lack of equity, market and historical
financial statements of BEVC. As a result, neither the Bank of Boston nor the Boston
Empowerment Center could support BEVC.
Business Plan
Both the Boston Empowerment Center and the Bank of Boston felt that the business plan
was both well written and researched. On the other hand, they felt that the growth rate in the
business plan had no basis in the reality. Based on the market and state of the technology, neither
investor believed the projections. They did not think that municipalities would purchase the buses
and that they could compete with diesel powered buses. As a result, they could not be convinced
that they could ever recoup their investment.
Another problem that the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center had with
the business plan was the lack of historical documents to support the projected growth in the
business plan. Tocci said that before the Boston Empowerment Center would lend money to
anyone, he needs to know that the business has grown to the point at which it can support the loan
even if the growth projections are not met. Ocko and Pellegrino of the Bank of Boston, voiced
similar concerns. Unfortunately, SVMC could not provide these document for either the Bank of
Boston or the Boston Empowerment Center. As a result, they could not be convinced that they
would ever be repaid.
Start-up Capital
Both the Boston Empowerment Center and Bank of Boston felt that BEVC did not bring
sufficient funds to the table to start a business. For this type of venture, Tocci felt that BEVC
should have $15 million in equity. Instead, BEVC did not have an equity investor and the only
available funds for equity was the OCS grant of $600,000 - far short of the $15 million Tocci was
looking for. Tocci felt that a $15 million equity position was important to assure him that he would
be repaid. Ocko provided another motivation for an equity position - risk management. Having
equity in the company would allow BEVC to survive in case the business were to have any trouble
in implementing the business plan.
Managemient
In the business plan, Duffy was identified as interim President of BEVC until someone
could be identified to take control of the business. Also, he was supposed to bring part of his
management team to facilitate the implementation of BEVC. Neither the Bank of Boston nor the
Boston Empowerment Center doubted the capabilities of Duffy or his team, but were concerned
about the fact that a team had not been identified to take over their positions.
Unknown to the Boston Empowerment Center and the Bank of Boston is that Duffy had
no intentions of running the business and that SBCH and Boston Edison felt that he was an
incompetent manager. Feri believed that he had no control over his costs and did not know what
it meant to take a company from research and development to manufacturing. Both Nee and Gallo
concur. As a result, Gallo and Ferr searched for potential entrepreneurs to run BEVC.
Unfortunately, they were not able to find anyone to run BEVC. There was nobody willing to take
the risk of trying to implement this business.
Conclusion
Timmons has identified three elements that are necessary to starting a business: an
entrepreneur, an opportunity and resources. Between SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC, one could
argue that collectively, they performed the duties of an entrepreneur, however, looking at each
organization on its own, it would be impossible to argue that each organization could have played
the role of the entrepreneur alone. Similarly, there does not appear to be the opportunity and
resources sufficient to start BEVC. In fact, it seems difficult to identify any glimmer of hope,
forcing one to ask how this project ever made it as far as it did and why was it ever brought to the
Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center. Chapter 6 will address these issues.
Chapter 6: Justification
Introduction
Based on the analysis in Chapter 5, BEVC is not a viable business opportunity - neither the
opportunity nor the resources existed to start BEVC. When asked whether or not they would have
lent money to BEVC, if enough equity had been present and a market for electric buses existed
both the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center said no. For instance, because of
Duffy's financial distress, Tocci of the Boston Empowerment Center was worried that Duffy's
creditors would have rights to any money lent to BEVC. In summary, based on the analysis in the
previous chapter, some would argue that the BEVC should never have been implemented.
In spite of such criticism, the fact is that SBCH and Boston Edison tried to start BEVC
with Duffy as the technology partner and purported manager. The purpose of this chapter is to
explain why. Among the reasons discussed in this chapter are: (1) the differences between
economic development and business development, (2) "overzealousness" and optimism and (3) a
reliance on the work and reputation of others.
Economic Development vs. Business Development
One of the most prominent explanations provided by Gallo, Nee, Walsh and Ferr for
working on this project is the belief that economic development deals are different from business
development deals. Because of this difference, both SBCH and Boston Edison believed that BEVC
deserved special attention from the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center.
Gallo, Nee and Walsh argue that BEVC deserved differential treatment from the Bank of
Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center because it was an economic development deal, not
your typical business. According to Gallo, business deals that fall under the rubric of economic
development include, "those deals that the market would not carry and need public funds to
provide that extra necessary boost." In translation, economic development is the business of
helping to start those businesses that have been rejected by the private sector. Nee emphasized this
dichotomy when he expressed his concern that businesses are hesitant to get involved with CDC's
because of all the social issues, such as having to hire low-income workers, that are bundled with
their involvement.
Walsh perceives a similar difference between economic development and business
development, but has a different way of expressing his thoughts. To him economic development is
a necessity. Economic development is a process in which you build on your needs, assess your
strengths and weaknesses and pool the necessary resources to accomplish your goals. To Walsh,
Boston needs manufacturing jobs and BEVC means to accomplish this goal. Because it filled a void
in Boston's employment needs, Walsh believes that the City of Boston should have worked closely
with Boston Edison and SBCH to implement this project. Unfortunately, Walsh does not believe
that the City of Boston provided enough support.
To him, this is attributed to the fact that they have a different interpretation of economic
development. According to Walsh, the City has a conservative approach to economic development
and only supports "bankable deals". Walsh does not agree with this outlook and thinks that the City
of Boston should take more risks.
"Overzealousness" and Optimism
Of those interviewed within SBCH and Boston Edison, there is a common feeling that if
they had the opportunity to start over again they would all do something different. I think that Feri
best explained this regret with the term "overzealousness" and optimism. A rough translation of
overzealousness is that everyone was so excited to see this project happening that they would do
whatever it took to make it happen. The optimism emanated from the fact that both Walsh and
Nee felt that everything would work out in the end.
Gallo, Nee and Ferri all agree that Duffy should have written the business plan, instead of
Gallo. Gallo wrote the business plan because she perceived that Duffy did not know enough about
his business to develop a satisfactory business plan. If they could start over, Gallo, Ferri and Nee
argue that Duffy should write the business plan to demonstrate his desire to implement this project.
To both SBCH and Boston Edison, writing the business plan demonstrates a commitment to the
project. In this case, Gallo showed that she wanted the project to occur, but the technology partner
and purported manager, Duffy, did not because he did not write the business plan.
Optimism is responsible for the ways in which SBCH and Boston Edison interpreted the
financial distress of Duffy. Gallo recalls coming back from California after having learned that
Duffy was considering bankruptcy and suggesting that they stop working with Duffy. Instead of
heeding her advice, she recalls both Nee and Walsh urging her to continue working with Duffy in
hopes that he would get his act together if he saw progress being made.
Lack of Due Diligence
In her review of the business plan, Auerback felt that if the necessary due diligence had
been conducted by SBCH and Boston Edison, then this project would never have occurred because
SBCH and Boston Edison would have realized that Duffy was an inadequate manager. To
Auerback, there are many elements that compose an adequate "due diligence package". Some of the
elements are a credit check, industry analysis, talking with customers and asking questions such as,
"Has the business or manager ever performed what we are asking him or her to perform?" or "Has
the company ever expanded or relocated?" In performing this analysis, Auerback found that Duffy
did not manage his costs, owed money to many companies, had not completed a variety of
contracts and had never expanded his operations. As a result, -Auerback does not believe that Duffy
was qualified to run BEVC and recommended that Boston Edison and SBCH sever all business ties
with Duffy - both SBCH and Boston Edison agreed.
What is interesting about Auerback's conclusions is that SBCH and Boston Edison had the
same information, but interpreted it differently. For instance, SBCH and Boston Edison knew that
Duffy had trouble fulfilling his contracts. Instead of using this as evidence to discontinue working
with Duffy, SBCH and Boston Edison tried to secure outstanding orders for BEVC. As part of a
demonstration contract, in 1993, SVMC had been contracted by the Northeast Alternative Vehicle
Consortium to produce two 31 foot buses for the New York Power Authority. By 1996, SVMC had
not completed the buses and had not forecasted a completion date. Using this as an opportunity to
secure business for BEVC, SBCH and Boston Edison expended much time and energy working
with the Northeast Alternative Vehicle Consortium to maintain these contracts.
In talking with Gallo and Feri, it does not appear that they were ignorant to due diligence
as Auerback defines the term, but that they relied on the reputation and work of each other. Gallo
admits that she did not find SVMC through exhaustive research, but found them through the work
of the Chief Engineer in the electric vehicle department at Boston Edison. Also, she feels that she
was willing to work with SVMC, sacrificing due diligence because Boston Edison was willing to
work with SVMC. To Gallo, there was no reason to believe that Boston Edison would get involved
with a company that did not offer a real opportunity. From Boston Edison's perspective , the Chief
Engineer was responsible for researching and developing relationships with businesses. Because the
Chief Engineer identified AVS, Solectria and SVMC, there appears to be a feeling that his work was
adequate and did not merit criticism.
Conclusion: Promoting Viable Business Opportunities
The fact that SBCH and Boston Edison could justify submitting the business plan to the
Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center in spite of the fact that BEVC was not a
viable business opportunity and Duffy was an inadequate manager is problematic. It demonstrates
that SBCH and Boston Edison did not understand the needs of the Bank of Boston and the
Boston Empowerment Center. As a result, the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment
Center may question the integrity of future business deals brought by either SBCH or Boston
Edison.
Both members at SBCH and Boston Edison felt that the Bank of Boston and the Boston
Empowerment Center reacted conservatively to the BEVC business plan. Importantly, the Bank of
Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center are inherently conservative organizations. The Bank
of Boston will not lend money unless it can be certain that its funds can be recouped. This explains
Ocko's belief that BEVC should have substantial equity in the business to act as collateral. For the
Boston Empowerment Center, job creation is most important. Tocci did not want to lend money
to any business that could not create long-term jobs. Instead of pursuing money from these two
organizations, SBCH and Boston Edison should have considered pursuing venture capital.
Traditionally, venture capital has assumed more risk than banks.
The ramification of advocating for BEVC to both the Bank of Boston and the Boston
Empowerment Center, in spite of its flaws, is that SBCH and Boston Edison jeopardize their
credibility. Next time either of these organizations bring business deals to either the Bank of Boston
or the Boston Empowerment Center, they run the risk of tainting the project because of their past
failure. Because many community organizations, like SBCH, are new to business development, they
need to pay special attention to their reputation.
One way for community organizations to enhance their reputation when it comes to
business development is to pursue viable business opportunities. A viable business opportunity is
one with a market and someone to lead the business with adequate experience in the industry and
business. Community organizations may choose to partner with the private sector to bring these
businesses into their community or foster these businesses on their own. Regardless, this chapter, in
conjunction with the previous chapter, demonstrates that the Bank of Boston and the Boston
Empowerment Center were not interested in anything but the viability of the business.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
Introduction
Originally, I intended to demonstrate the influence of the network consisting of SBCH,
Boston Edison and SVMC on their efforts to start BEVC, however, since fundamental business
issues, such as a lack of market and competent manger were not present, the network was not an
influencing factor on BEVC. For instance, because organizations such as the Bank of Boston and
the Boston Empowerment Center did not think that there was a market for electric buses nor did
they believe Duffy was competent to run BEVC, these organizations were not concerned with the
ways in SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC contributed to starting BEVC. As a result, my analysis in
chapters 5 and 6 have led me to an understanding that before community organizations devote time
and resources to starting businesses they need to take the time to evaluate potential business
opportunities to ensure that there is a market and a qualified individual to run the business. Without
a market and a competent manager, private-sector support may not be enough to start a business
and the business is unlikely to succeed.
Although I am unable to discuss the influence of the network consisting of SBCH, Boston
Edison and SVMC on the business development process, I did have the opportunity to characterize
the network in chapter 4. In chapter 4, I discovered that SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC did not
develop the trust and reciprocity characteristic of successful networks. Rather than ignoring the fact
that these organizations could not work together, I use this experience to discuss one way in which
future organizations can work together to build a successful network. One of the ways SBCH,
Boston Edison and SVMC might have improved their relationships is if they had taken the time to
clarify their expectations and roles. By putting all of this information into a "network document" at
the beginning of the process, they could have referred to it throughout the business development
process to evaluate each other's performance.
Merging the need for community and economic development practitioners to evaluate
business opportunities before devoting time and resources to the start-up of a business and the
need to develop a "network document" , I have constructed a framework to guide practitioners in
their decision to participate in the start-up of a business in their community. The framework is
presented on the following page as Figure 2.
The decision making process begins with identifying a business opportunity. Once a
business opportunity has been identified, the next step is for the community organization to
evaluate the opportunity. The evaluation process is broken into two stages. The first stage is
preliminary and is designed to screen out those businesses that do not have either a market nor a
competent manager. If there is a market and manager, then the next step is to proceed with the
second stage of business evaluation. The purpose of proceeding with the evaluation is to ensure
that the market is sufficient, the manager in question is truly competent and most importantly,
starting the business is consistent with organizational goals. If the second stage evaluation is
successful, then I recommend community organization take the time to develop what I call a
"network document". Importantly, if either the first stage or second stage business evaluation is
unsuccessful, in other words, there really is no market or the manager is not capable of running the
business, then my recommendation is to stop pursuing the business opportunity. For the rest of
this chapter, I argue for the need to apply this framework and elaborate on the need for community
organizations to evaluate businesses and develop a "network document".
Figure 2: Decision Making Process for Business Development
Evaluating Businesses
One of the most important lessons I have drawn from this thesis is the need for community
organizations to evaluate businesses for themselves. Within this evaluation, there are two stages.
The first stage includes screening the business opportunity for a market and competent manager.
With both of these elements, I recommend community and economic development practitioners
proceed to a second stage of analysis in which community and economic development practitioners
conduct further research on the business opportunity and debate whether or not the business
opportunity is consistent with organizational goals and community needs. Importantly, without
either a market or a competent manager, there is no need to move to the second stage.
Before the BEVC business plan had been completed, individuals at both SBCH and
Boston Edison learned that Duffy was in financial distress and was an incompetent manager. This
was demonstrated by the fact that Duffy did not have adequate financial statements and did not
know much about his industry. Nonetheless, Gallo completed the business plan and submitted it to
the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center for funding. This proved to be a waste
of time. After reviewing the business plan, there was overwhelming agreement from Ocko at the
Bank of Boston and Tocci at the Boston Empowerment Center that BEVC was not worthy of
investment. They were both concerned that Duffy could not run BEVC and that any money
invested to BEVC would go directly to his creditors.
In the framework I have developed, SBCH and Boston Edison should never have
completed the business plan. Although I benefit from hindsight, the consequences of bringing the
business plan to the Bank of Boston and the Boston Empowerment Center are potentially severe.
Both SBCH and Boston Edison threaten their credibility by promoting a business deal that is not
viable.
On the other hand, if there is a market and a competent manager for a particular business,
then I suggest that community and economic development practitioners proceed to a second stage
of analysis. The second stage is meant to increase the comfort level of a community organization in
starting a particular business. In order to assist community and economic development practitioners
in the second stage of evaluation, I have composed a list of questions that should be answered.
These questions are meant to stimulate further research on the potential manager and business
opportunity. At the same time, they are meant to provoke community organizations to consider
whether or not starting a particular business is consistent with their goals. In preparing these
questions, I draw not only from my experience in preparing this case-study, but my interview with
Auerback. With eighteen years of experience in the banking community, Auerback understands the
questions that individuals should ask in evaluating a business.7
1. Does creating this business satisfy the goals and mission of my organization?
2. What is the track record of the entrepreneur? Has this person successfully started businesses in
the past?
3. Has this person or business you are working with successfully achieved what you are asking him
or her to accomplish now? *
4. If going to partner with them, need to know where are they located and have they ever
relocated?*
5. What do current suppliers,. customers or creditors say about this person or business you are
working with?*
6. How would you characterize the industry for the product or service? Are the barriers to entry
high or low? Is competition fierce?
Questions influenced by Auerback are denoted with an asterisk.
While this list of questions is partial, I believe it provides a base for community and
economic development practitioners. Unfortunately, the difficult part is saying which questions are
more important and what happens when only some of the questions have been answered positively.
How to proceed can only be determined by the person doing the research and evaluation. In order
to determine the next step, my hope is that the person doing the research will either have
experience in starting businesses or consult with someone who does. Assuming that there is a real
opportunity to start a business, and that a community organization intends on working with other
organizations to start the business, the next step is to develop what I call a "network document". I
elaborate on this document in the following section.
Evaluating Networks
After evaluating the business opportunity for a market and manager, the next step for
community organizations is to develop the organizational infrastructure necessary to work in a
network. My recommendation is that when organizations first start working together they take the
time to create a document which establishes a clear set of expectations, goals and time-lines for one
another - this is what I have been referring to as a "network document". By revisiting this
document throughout the business development process, organizations can use this document as a
means to evaluate the performance of one another. For instance, when partners cannot fulfill
expectations or perform duties in a timely manner the network can be dissolved.
SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC did not take the time to develop a set of expectations,
goals and time-lines for one another or for the project to start BEVC. This proved to be
problematic. For example, when Duffy did not provide Gallo with audited financial statements on
SVMC or information on the electric vehicle industry, both Gallo and Feri have made the case that
in the future they would not intervene and write the business plan, but would insist that the
purported entrepreneur compose the plan. In this case, I would argue that Gallo wrote the business
plan because the roles and responsibilities for each organization were never defined. The only
formal agreement that existed between SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC is the first memorandum
of agreement (MOA). If you recall from chapter 3, the first MOA specified the potential ownership
structure of BEVC, board representation, royalty stream and protocol for technology transfer.
There were no guidelines for which organization should write the business plan, search for funding
and when these tasks should be accomplished. As a result, even when it had become more than
apparent that Duffy was not going to take the lead in starting BEVC, SBCH and Boston Edison
continued trying to start BEVC because it was never explicitly defined that the project hinged on
Duffy's cooperation.
Creating a document which defines the roles and responsibilities of an organization engaged
in a network can facilitate the evaluation of network members throughout the business
development process. Depending on the time-line for the project, organizations can meet monthly,
quarterly or semi-annually. In these meetings, organizations should review the document and
compare their progress. If an organization is unable to accomplish specified tasks, then this
organization should be forced to justify their failure. In enduring this process, it should become
clear which organizations in a network are capable of fulfilling their roles and which are more
interested in free-riding. If an organization cannot justify their inability to complete a task and this
proves to be a repeated occurrence, then this organization should be asked to leave the network. In
this case, Duffy should have been asked to leave the network because he could not be trusted to
run BEVC nor was he willing to invest time to find alternate ways of starting BEVC without his
leadership.
Undoubtedly, instituting this layer of formality will be a burden for networks and
community organizations, but it will be extremely useful in the long-run. It will help prevent
community organizations from investing time and effort in a project that is not going to succeed
and improve the credibility of community organizations in their efforts to sponsor business
development in their communities. Simultaneously, it ensures that networks optimize their
relationships with other organizations in the network.
Revisiting Porter's Model of Economic Development
Before ending this case-study, I would like to conclude with some final remarks on Porter's
model of community and economic development. This case-study demonstrates that Porter's
model of economic development is too simple to guide economic development practitioners
interested in business development. The fact that the private sector supports a business
development initiative does not necessarily guarantee success. For instance, in this case, Boston
Edison initiated and supported efforts to start BEVC, yet BEVC does not exist. I have argued that
this has to do with the fact that BEVC is not a viable business. Thus, what should really matter to
community and economic development practitioners is whether or not the proposed business
opportunity is viable, not whether or not the private sector supports the business.
Another refinement to Porter's model is that community organizations gain the knowledge
and experience to evaluate business plans and decide for themselves whether or not they should
work with the private sector in starting a business. In contrast, Porter relegates community
organizations to positions of powerlessness; Porter advocates that community organizations devote
their efforts to organizing community support for private sector business development initiatives.
In this case, SBCH bought into the reputation and credibility of Boston Edison. As a result, SBCH
did not act on the many signals which indicated that BEVC was not a viable business and that
Duffy was incapable of running BEVC. By trusting Boston Edison, SBCH jeopardized their
reputation. If community organizations want to maintain their credibility and establish a reputation
for supporting successful businesses, they must gain the experience and knowledge to review
potential business opportunities for themselves.
Appendix 1
Interview List
Network Alembers
1. Ms. Beverly Byer Gallo
Mr. Martin Nee
South Boston Community Housing
2. Mr. Mark Ferr
Mr. Donald Walsh
Boston Edison -- Economic Development Department
3. Mr. Don Duffy
Mr. Newton Montano
Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation
Non-network members
1. Mr. Robert Ocko
Mr. Joe Pellegrino
Bank of Boston
2. Mr. Bob Brandweine
Policy & Management Associates
3. Mr. Martin McDonough
City of Boston - Public Facilities Department
4. Mr. Francesco Tocci
Boston Empowerment Center
5. Ms. Amy Auerback
6. Mr. Tom Webb
Northeast Alternative Vehicle Consortium
7. Mr. John Powell
Electric Transportation and Vehicle Institute
8. Mr. Vic De Luca
Jessie smith Noyes Foundation
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Appendix 2
Survey Instruments
Interview Questions: Non-Network Members
Name
Organization
Phone Number
Interview Date
Introduction
Hello, my name is David White and I am a second year Master's candidate in the Department of
Urban and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. My thesis focuses on the work
of South Boston Community Housing, Inc., Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing to
start an electric vehicle manufacturing company in South Boston. In this interview, I strive to get
information and your opinion on your organization, the project and the relationships of the
organizations involved. Do you have any questions, before we begin?
I. Background Information
Could you tell me about the mission and priorities of your organization?
Could you tell me about yourself ? What are your responsibilities?
I. Electric Vehicle Industry and Manufacturing Opportunities
What opportunity(ies) exist to manufacture electric buses? Do these opportunities exist in
Massachusetts?
What are the barriers to entry for a start-up in the electric vehicle industry ? More specifically, for
anyone attempting to start an electric bus company in Boston, Massachusetts?
How would you characterize the competition to produce electric buses? Who are the
competitors? On what basis do they compete?
III. The Project
How did you and your organization get involved in the project to manufacture electric vehicles in
South Boston?
Why did your organization get involved in this project? What were your objectives?
What did you perceive as the strengths of the project and the organization involved? What about
weaknesses?
IV. The Network
In what ways do you think each organization contributed to this project?
Now, I would like to ask you four questions in order to characterize the working relationships
between South Boston Community Housing, Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing
Corporation?
For this project, what do you think was the vision each organization had for this project?
To what extent do you think these organizations worked together?
To what extent do you think these organizations trusted one another?
In what ways do you think each organization depended on one another?
What critical components of success were present among South Boston Community Housing, Inc.,
Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Company? What was missing? What was
missing?
What do you think are the qualities of successful team members?
V. Management
Why do you think electric buses are not currently being produced in South Boston?
What do you think needed to change for their to be electric bus manufacturing in South Boston?
Did you ever make any of your opinions or recommendations known to any of the team
members? Yes No
If yes, how did SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC respond to your suggestions?
If no, why did you not say anything?
VI. Conclusion
Thank you very much for taking the time to let me interview you for my thesis.
Would you like a final draft of my thesis? Yes No
Do you have any other questions for me?
Is there anyone else you think that I may contact to enrich my analysis?
Interview Questions: Network Members- South Boston Community Housing
Name
Organization
Position
Phone
Interview Date
Introduction
Hello, my name is David White and I am a second year Master's candidate in the Department of
Urban and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. My thesis focuses on the work
of South Boston Community Housing, Inc., Boston Edison and Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing to
start an electric vehicle manufacturing company in South Boston. In this interview, I strive to
gather information and your opinion on your organization, the project and the relationships of the
organizations involved. Do you have any questions, before we begin ?
I. Background Information
What were your responsibilities as they pertained to starting Boston Electric Vehicle Company?
Why was your organization/ department interested in electric vehicle manufacturing in South
Boston?
II. Characterizing the Network
What was your vision or expected outcome for the project? What was the vision of SBCH?
How did you find out about Boston Edison?
Why did Boston Edison ask you to get involved in the project?
How did you find out about Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation?
Why did Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation get involved in this project?
What role or roles did Boston Edison play? SVMC?
Did a formal arrangement exist between SBCH, Boston Edison and SVMC?
What was done together and what was done separately?
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What were the most important assets SVMC brought to this project? SBCH? Boston Edison?
How were decisions made? (Any specific examples)
How often were you in communication with Boston Edison? Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing
Corporation?
How were tasks accomplished?
What did SBCH see as the necessary resources to succeed? What were the gaps?
III. Management
How did other organizations respond to this project?
Bank of Boston :
Northeast Alternative Vehicle Consortium
Boston Empowerment Center:
Subaru of America:
In what ways did you respond to the suggestions of these organizations ?
IV. Evaluation
Why do you think electric buses are not being manufactured in South Boston?
What do you think needed to change in order to manufacture electric buses in South Boston?
What might you have done differently?
V. Some Case Specific Questions
Originally, AVS was supposed to work on this project, whatever happened to them ?
When did you first find out about Don's financial difficulties?
How did you find out about his financial difficulties?
Why was NAVC involved in this project?
What was the purpose of the ACL/AAI project? Why was it never implemented?
What was the role of the Chief Engineer in the Electric Vehicle Department in Boston Edison?
Why is the Chief Engineer no longer working on this project ?
What do you think was the impact of his leaving the project ?
VI. Conclusion
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this interview.
Would you like a final draft of my thesis? Yes No
Do you have any other questions for me?
Is there anyone else I may contact to enrich my analysis?
Appendix 3
Chronology of Events
1995
December
The Economic Development Department at Boston Edison approaches SBCH to
participate in a project to start a business to manufacture electric vehicles.
February
SBCH hires Bob Brandweine and completes the Department of Health and Human
Services, Offices of Community Services grant for $700,000.
August
SBCH is awarded $600,000 from the Department of Health and Human Services to start
and electric vehicle manufacturing plant in South Boston.
September
SBCH and the Economic Development Department at South Boston invite local business
leaders, academics and politicians to Join a steering committee.
Vic De Luca of the Jessie Smith Noyes foundation awards SBCH $30,000 in general
operating support.
November
The Chief Electric Vehicle Engineer and Project Manager in the Electric Vehicle Division
leaves Boston Edison and is unable to come to terms with SBCH on a contract for
employment.
December
SBCH unsuccessfully attempts to raise $35,000 in general operating support from the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation.
Gallo travels to California to meet Duffy of Specialty Vehicle Manufacturing Corporation
and discuss opportunities to collaborate and start an electric bus manufacturing company in
South Boston.
1996
January
Gallo travels to California to collect market and financial information for the Boston
Electric Vehicle Company Business Plan.
SBCH and the Economic Development Department at Boston Edison learn that Duffy is
in financial distress and considering filing for bankruptcy.
SBCH and Duffy of SVMC sign the First Memorandum of Agreement.
February
Gallo of SBCH completes the BEVC business plan
March
The BEVC business plan is submitted to the Bank of Boston and the Boston
Empowerment Center for funding.
Boston Electric Vehicle Company is incorporated in Massachusetts.
April
Both the Boston Empowerment Center and the Bank of Boston refuse to invest in BEVC.
Ferri and Gallo try to recruit someone to run BEVC.
Ferri and Gallo meet with Subaru of America to discuss the opportunity to invest equity in
BEVC.
Gallo and Nee of SBCH negotiate terms for a three year lease on at the Subaru Facility at
the Marine Industrial Park in South Boston.
May
Ferri devises the ACL/AAI deal to obtain Duffy's technology.
June
Duffy travels to Boston to develop the second memorandum of agreement.
The Economic Development Department at Boston Edison hires Auerback to evaluate the
BEVC business plan and Duffy.
July
SBCH and the Economic Development Department at Boston Edison are told that Duffy
is bring sued for fraud by CALSTART in California.
August
SBCH and the Economic Development Department at Boston Edison sever all business
ties with Duffy.
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